

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-2020-MA-01

Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.0ed

from

Continental Automotive GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-2020.

The change to the certified product is at the level of non security relevant configuration modifications on the implementation level. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-2020 dated 14 December 2020 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-2020.

Bonn, 22 March 2021

The Federal Office for Information Security



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.0ed, Continental Automotive GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.0ed was changed due to non relevant configuration modifications on implementation level. Some modules classified as SFR supporting and SFR non-interfering in TDS were changed to be able to request the external DSRC ECU serial number via CAN message in and be able to configure in which byte order the serial number is to be stored inside the Tachograph. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from DTCO 1381 R4.0e to DTCO 1381 R4.0ed.

The Security Target was editorially updated.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of implementation. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-2020 dated 14 December 2020 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] Impact Analysis Report Smart Tachograph DTCO 1381 R4.0ed, Revision 1.7, 2021-02-24, Continental AG (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-2020 for Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.0e, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2020-12-14
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-2020-Ma-01, Version 1.2, 2021-02-16, Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381 Security Target for Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.0e and 4.0ed, Continental AG
- [5] Configuration List DTCO 1381 Release 4.0e and 4.0ed, Revision 1.25, 2021-03-15, Continental AG (Confidential document)